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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SEABOARD FINANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and AppellOJnt,
vs.
L. V. SHIRE, doing business as Shire
Motor Company,
Defendant,

Case No.
7299

BANK OF VERNAL, VERNAL,
UTAH, a corporation,
Garnishee and Respondent.

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action involves a dispute between the Plaintiff and the Garnishee Defendant, Bank of Vernal, hereinafter called ' ' The Bank. '' The appeal is on the judgment roll only. A detailed statement of facts is contained
in the Findings of Fact, Tr. No. 74-84.
Briefly the essential facts are :
Prior to the time of garnishment in this action the
Defendant, L. V. Shire, became indebted to the Bank
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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on three promissory notes, one for $11,270.00, one for
$2,065.00 and one for $1,!l00.00. The $11,270.00 note was
secured by a Trust Receipt and a Chattel Mortgage on
five Frazer automobiles. rrhe note for $2,065.00 was unsecured and the note for $1,500.00 was secured by a Chattel Mortgage on automotive equipment.
In the month of February, 1948, the Defendant,
Shire, had a checking account in the Bank. On February
17, 1949 without any authority from the Defendant,
Shire, the Bank charged Shire's bank account with the
sum of $2,783.17, and applied the same in reduction of
the balance owing on the $11,270.00 note which was then
owing by Shire to the Bank. On February 21, 1948,
without any authority from the Defendant, Shire, the
Bank charged Shire's account with the sum of $2,605.00
and applied $1,800.00 of said sum on the $2,065.00 note
and applied $805.00 of said sum on the $1,500.00 note.
A Garnishment was served on the Bank on February
24, 1948, but the charging of Shire's account as aforesaid depleted his funds in said account in said Bank.
At the time of the service of the Garnishment the
Court found that the Bank had in its possession a 1947
Frazer automobile which was one of the automobiles included in the Trust Receipt and Chattel Mortgage referred to above, some accessories and miscellaneous automotive equipment and a used Ford sedan.
After the service of the Writ of Garnishment the
Bank sold the Ford automobile and applied the net pro2
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ceeds in payment of the balance awing on the $2,065.00
note. Thereafter the mortgage securing the $1,500.00
note was foreclosed. The mortgage securing the $11,270.00
note was never foreclosed. The interest of the Defendant,
Shire, in the Frazer automobile was attached by the
Plaintiff in this action and the Plaintiff and the Bank
joined in the sale thereof for $1.~):35.00, which funds were
retained by the Bank.
The Court found that after the amounts realized
from the sale of the two automobiles and mortgaged
property that there was a balance of $163.58 in possession of the Bank subject to Garnishment.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
The Trial Court erred in the following:
1. In concluding that the Bank had the right to retain the credits of the Defendant, Shire, in his checking
account and apply the same in payment of the balance of
his indebtedness to said Bank which remained after
applying thereon the proceeds of the sale of the two
automobiles and the remaining mortgaged chattels.
2. In concluding that the sum of $163.58 only was
subject to the Garnishment of the Plaintiff.

3. In failing to conclude that the amounts which
were charged against the Defendant, Shire's account and
applied on the two secured notes were subject to the
Plaintiff's Writ of Garnishment.
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4. In entering a Garinshee Judgment against the
Bank for the sum of 163.58 only.
5. In failing to make and enter a Garnishee J udgment against said Bank for the amounts which were
charged against the bank account of the Defendant,
Shire, and applied on the two secured notes of Shire
which were held by the Bank.
ARGUMENT
All of the Assignments of Error have to do with one
question, namely: when served with the Writ of Garnishment did the Bank have the right to retain the credits of
the Defendant, Shire, in its possession until it had exhausted its security and apply said credits on the deficiency owing by the Defendant, Shire, if any?
This involves a construction of Section 104-19-13 of
the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which reads as follows:
''Every garnishee shall be allowed to retain
or deduct out of the property, effects or credits
of the defendant in his hands all demands against
the plaintiff and all demands against the defendarnt of which he could have availed himself if he
had not been s1tmmoned as garnishee, whether the
same are at the time due or not, and he shall be
liable for the balance only after all mutual demands between himself and plaintiff and defendant are adjusted, not including unliquidated damages for wrongs and injuries; provided, that the
verdict or finding, as well as the record of the
judgment, shall show in all cases against which
party any counter claim is allowed, if any is allowed, and the amount thereof." (Italics ours)
4
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The key to the meaning of the ~tatute is found in the
italicized portions above. To paraphase the wording of
the statute, the Bank had the right to retain or deduct
out of the property subject to Garnishment all of the demands agaiw~t the defendant of ll'hich it could have availed itself if it had Hot been summoned as Garnishee·
ll'hether the same were at the time due O'r not, and was
liable to the Plaintiff after all muhtal demarnds between
itself and the Defendant, Shire, were adjusted.
Plaintiff contends the case of Zion's Savings Bank
and Trust Company, vs., Rouse 86 Utah 574, 47 Pac. 2d
618, is conclusive authority for the proposition that the
secured notes of Shire held by the Bank were not ''demands" which the Bank could have availed itself of "had
it not been summoned as Garnishee,'' and that the checking account and the secured notes were not such "mutual demands'' which might be adjusted as contemplated
by the statute. In the Rouse case, the Defendants therein
had obtained three loans from the Bank, one in 1925,
which was secured by a real estate mortgage, one in 1932,
secured by a Chattel Mortgage, and one in 1933 secured
by a Chattel :Mortgage. The proceeds of the 1933 loan
were left with the Bank and without authority from the
Defendants applied by the Bank in payment of the 1925
loan which was then past due. The Bank then brought an
action to foreclose the two Chattel Mortgages securing
the notes of 1932 and 1933. The Defendants pleaded a
Counter Claim to the Second Cause of Action, that of
the note of 1933, for the sum of $857.00, which was the
amount of the proceeds of the 1933 loan and which proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ceeds had been taken by the Bank and applied on the 1925
note which was secured by a real estate mortgage.
The Court construed Section 104-55-1 of the Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, which reads in part as follows:
''There can be hut one action for the recovery
of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real estate or personal property, which action must be in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter . . . ''
The Court referred to an earlier Utah case of Blue Creek
Land & Livestock Co., vs. l{ehrer, 60 Utah 62, 206 Pac.
287, which case held that a mortgagee can not levy a
Garnishment or Attachment on property of the debtor in
the hands of a third person without first exhausting its
security and obtaining a deficiency judgment. The Court
then held in the instal)t case that the Bank had no rights
of off-set permitting it to apply the Junds in its possession on the secured note of 1925 before a deficiency judgment was obtained. In discussing this proposition the
Court said on page 619 :
''From these derisions it would seem to follow logically and naturally that a mortgagee, who
could not reach by attachment or garnishment the
assets of the debtor in the hands of a third party,
could not for similar reasons apply personal
credits in its own hands as an offset in reduction
of the mortgage debt.
"(3) The right of a bank to apply a depositor's funds, held by it, to payment of his indebtedness, can exist only ·where each occupies the
position of debtor and creditor, and where there
exists mutual demands. 5 Michie, Banks and
6
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Banking ~16. Both maturitv and mutualitY are
t•~st•ntial to the validity of n ·setoff.
·
•• (-!) The status of the mortgage debt under
a statute likP R. ~. Utah 1933, 104-5:>-1, construed
as it has been hy this rourt, is somewhat analogous
to one not yPt due, or one that lacks mutuality.
True the debt is past due but the rreditor is not
yet in a position to obtain personal judgment
against the debtor or to proceed to satisfy the
debt out of the debtor's assets other than the
mortgag·ed property. Until the fund set up as a
sec11rity for the debt is exhausted and the deficiency, if any, is ascertained, the debts are on a
differeut footing. They are not mutual personal
obligat,;ons ll'hiclz may be set off against each other
and compensated pro tanto." (Italics ours)

The reason for the rule is stated by the Court on
Page 620 in a quotation from 4. Cal. Jur. 270:
"The reason of the rule which gives to banks
the right to appropriate deposits for the payment
of the debtor's matured indebtedness does not apply where the bank has security for that indebtedness. The ordinary presumption that it is the depositor's intent to have his note discharged from
his deposit does not exist where the note is so
secured. It has been said to be but reasonable that
when the legislature declared that there should
be but one action to enforce a debt secured by
mortgage, it did not mean that payment could be
enforced against the consent of the mortgagor by
giving a bank the right to enforce payment under
a general banker's lien upon some other property,
and that, to, without any legal proceedings whatever. The rule, therefore, is that a mortgagee
bank must first look to the mortgaged premises
as constituting a prinwr~T fund out of which the
dul1t secured },y the mortgage must l>c pai<l, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

that mortgage security must be exhausted before
it can apply in reduction or cancellation of the
debt any money on deposit with it belonging to
the debtor."
When the Bank of Vernal charged the Defendant,
Shire's, account as it did, and applied the funds in payment of his secured indebtedness, Shire would have had
a right to recover such funds from the Bank as did the
Defendants in the Rouse case, supra.
'11 he Rouse case is conclusive authority for the proposition that as between the Defendant, Shire, and the
Bank, the Bank had no right of setoff. What greater
right of setoff, if any, did the Bank acquire through
Garnishment?

Broken down in its essential parts, the statute
in question permits the Garnishee to retain or deduct out
of the property garnisheed all demands of the Plaintiff
and all demands against the Defendant:
1. Of which the Garnishee could have availed himself if he had not been summoned as
Garnishee.
2. Whether the same are due or not.
3. And shall be liable only after all mutual
demands between himself and plaintiff and defendant are adjusted.
There are no demands claimed between Plaintiff and
the Garnishee so this element may be eliminated. From
the previous discussion of the Rouse case, supra, it is
obvious that the Bank could not have availed itself of its
secured demands, if it had not been summoned as
Garnishee, which disposes of item ( 1), and likewise the
8
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Rouse case holds that the serured indebtedness held by
the Bank ag-ainst the Defendant, Shire, and his checking
account in said Bank were not mutual demands which
could be adjush'd behn'Pn the Defendant and the Bank,
which disposes of item (3) above. The only enlargement
of the right of setoff created by the statute is found in
item (2) in that it includes demands not yet due. This
undoubtedly means that if the Bank had an unsecured demand against the Defendant which was not due at the
time of the Garnishment it could nevertheless offset the
same against the funds garnisheed. However, in referring to demands not yet due the statute can not be said
to include secured obligations because there is no demand, as such, in existence prior to the time the security is exhausted and a deficiency judgment is obtained.
In the case of the secured obligation there is only a prospective possibility of a demand which may or may not
arise the future, depending on whether the security is
sufficient to satisfy the obligation.
To contend that part number (2) of the statute as
set forth above includes a secured obligation prior to
deficiency judgment is to confuse an unmatured existing
demand with the question of whether or not a demand
exists at all. We have no doubt but what the Legislature intended to include a demand which was then in existence but not yet due rather than the prospective possibility of a demand which might never come into existence.
Therefore the enlargement of the right of setoff granted
by the statute does not include the secured obligations
owing by the Defendant, Shire, to the Bank.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There is no hardship or inequity in such an interpretation as stated in Zollman in his work on Banks
and Banking, Paragraph 4542, which reads as follows:
"The taking of collateral security for a note
is inconsistent with the theory upon which a
setoff, or banker's lien is founded. The bank by
accepting the note relies not on the general balance of the maker, but on the security which he
offers.''
The question before this Court was involved in the
case of Walters, vs., Bank of America, National Trust
and Savings Association which went before the Supreme
Court of California upon four occasions, and opinions
are reported in 44 Pac. 2d 601, 52 Pac. 2d 232, 59 Pac. 2d
983 and 69 Pac. 2d 839.
In the Walters case the Plaintiff contended the bank
had no right to setoff a secured indebtedness against the
garnisheed funds and urged the same argument advanced by the Appellant herein. The Plaintiff in the Walters
case cited Section 726 of the Civil Code of Procedure of
California, which is the same in substance as Section
104-51-1 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and cited
cases construing said section which upheld the same rule
as that advanced by this Court in the Rouse case, supra.
The bank in the Walters case, however, urged that the
rule of the cases cited had been altered by the amendment of Section 438 of the Civil Practice Act which provides that the right to maintain a counter claim shall not
be effected by the fact that either the Plaintiff's or the
Defendant's claim is secured by mortgage, or otherwise.
10
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Some of tlw Headnotes indicated that thP Court decided
that the bank wns entitled to n sPtoff although the obligation was secured. Ho\H'Yer, an examination of the rase
shows that the Court did not so hold, but held that the
Plaintiff had waiYed its right of setoff. The Court did
not make any decision as to what the effect of Section
438 \Vas with respect to the rule of the cases cited. The
Walters ease is important not for what the Court held,
but because of what the Court did not hold. In other
words, aside from the possible affect of Section 438,
which provision is not contained in the Utah Law, the
doctrine of the cases standing for the same proposition
as the Rouse case, supra, was held to be applicable to a
case of garnishment and was not disturbed.
In our search of the authorities we have found no
case in which a setoff of a secured indebtedness against
garnisheed funds was allowed in states which follow the
rule that there shall be but one action for the recovery of
a secured indebtedness.
The Appellant therefore respectfully urges thti:s
Court to set aside the Conclusions of Law and Judgment
of the trial Court and to make Conclusions of Law and
Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Bank
of Vernal f.or the amounts charged by the Bank against
the Defendant Shire's, account and applied upon its
secured indebtedness.
Respectfully submitted,
ROMNEY AND BOYER,
Attorneys for Appellants.
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